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THE STATE WE'RE IN:
LEGAL EDUCATION IN CANADA'S NEW POLITICAL
ECONOMY
by
Harry W. Arthurs*
1. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL EDUCATION ABOUT, IN, OF, FOR
AND AGAINST THE STATE
I will begin by proposing five simple and non-controversial propositions
concerning the relationship of the state to legal education:
I. Most lawyers-and other people-understand law as the distinctive nor-
mative system generated and administered by the state. Legal education
is therefore about the state.
2. Legal education is not autonomous, any more than law is autonomous.
Both are shaped by the surrounding society, culture and polity. In that
sense, legal education is in the state.
3. Legal education has as one of its main purposes the formation of legal prac-
titioners who will be awarded a license to participate in the professional
monopoly which the state has created. Moreover, the state licenses and
finances universities, subsidizes students and defines the goals and strate-
gies-even the technical modalities-of higher education. In all these
important respects, legal education is of the state: it belongs to the state.
4. Law-many would argue-expresses and advances the hegemonic power
of the state. Since legal education ultimately helps to reinforce state
authority and state policy, and incidentally trains future state functionar-
ies, it may therefore be considered as education in the service of the state,
for the state.
5. However, legal education is not onlyfor the state. Like all true education,
legal education is inherently subversive: conventional wisdom is not priv-
ileged and customary ways of doing things are not immune from criticism.
Indeed, many legal scholars and practitioners are committed to the notion
that law's mission is not to strengthen the state, but to restrain it, to reform
it, even to transform it. In this special sense, legal education is against the
state and, incidentally, against the law and against the legal profession as
well.
So: legal education is about, in, of, for and against the state. It follows that
* University Professor of Law and Political Science and President Emeritus, York Univer-
sity, Toronto. I am most grateful to the editors of the Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Jus-
tice for their invitation to deliver the Annual Access to Justice Lecture. This has enabled
me to bring together and then carry forward a number of streams of my previous writings
on legal education and scholarship and on the effects of globalization and neo-liberalism
on Canada's political economy. Since the present piece was prepared as a public lecture, I
have not provided extensive footnotes; in lieu I have mostly referred to earlier work which
is more conventionally footnoted.
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changes in the state and changes in political economy exert a significant-
perhaps definitive-influence on law, legal institutions and the legal pro-
fession and, therefore, on legal education.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND NEO-LIBERALISM
Over the past twenty years or so, two related developments have trans-
formed the political economy-and thus the legal systems-of most states,
including Canada. These developments-globalization and neo-liberal-
ism-have, in different ways, diminished state power and authority and
increased the importance and legitimacy of market forces.
Neo-liberalism-plain and simple-holds that state regulation of mar-
kets produces inefficiencies, discourages enterprise and innovation, dimin-
ishes personal and collective wealth and introduces serious distortions into
public policy. Mainstream neo-liberals accept that states must continue to
perform certain core functions, albeit more efficiently than they do now.
They have in mind such essential responsibilities as protecting property
rights, suppressing fraud, disciplining obstreperous labour unions, provid-
ing infrastructure for business and resolving business disputes. Other neo-
liberals-the fundamentalists-believe that markets, not states, can and
should distribute all public goods including health services, public security,
clean air and water, culture, education and law. Neo-liberal politicians-
including Prime Minister Thatcher, President Reagan and Premier Harris-
tend to shift from fundamentalism to the mainstream once elected to office.
Globalization next. Like neo-liberalism, globalization comes in a variety
of flavours. From, say, 1945 to 1970 or 1975, most western democracies
embraced a version of globalization which permitted them to develop
some version of social democracy and to promote a more secure, equitable
and richer life for their citizens. But from, say, the mid-1970s to the
present, the neo-liberal version of the global economy has displaced the
social democratic version. Its proponents have argued that so long as econ-
omies remain domestic in scale, so long as local producers are insulated
from world competition, so long as workers and consumers are sheltered
from the full force of market discipline by interventionist government poli-
cies, markets cannot work their magic. Thus, our present version of global-
ization is organized around the principle that key factors such as capital,
expertise and information must be allowed to flow across national borders,
free from state regulation. As a consequence, state activism-redistribu-
tive taxation, social welfare, aggressive anti-trust enforcement, environ-
mental regulation-has come to be regarded as inappropriate, if not
downright dangerous, because it is likely to result in adverse reactions
from the market, in disinvestment, devaluation of the currency and other
consequences dire enough to deter governments of almost all political
stripes. In this sense, neo-liberal globalization has become a self-fulfilling
prophecy, a "conditioning framework"' which has broken most govern-
1 R. Grinspun & R. Kreklewich, "Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: 'Free Trade' as a Con-
ditioning Framework" (1994) 43 Stud. in PoL. Economy 33.
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ments of their bad social democratic habits and atavistic interventionist
tendencies.
This intertwining of globalization and neo-liberalism is sometimes
referred to as the Washington Consensus not only because it is closely
associated with the philosophy which has dominated American govern-
ments since at least 1980, but because it is actively promoted by two pow-
erful international agencies located in Washington-the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). I am going to argue that the
Washington Consensus has had important implications for law as an insti-
tution of social control and a vehicle for social justice; it has restructured
law as a profession which occupies the strategic intersection of politics,
economics and social regulation in many countries; and it is in the process
of transforming law as an intellectual discipline and a field of study. But
before I make that argument, I want to qualify my description of the Wash-
ington Consensus in three respects.
First, the neo-liberal version of globalization did not just occur as a natu-
ral phenomenon, nor was it hatched by a few wicked capitalists conspiring
in the shadow of the White House. Rather, it developed from some sophis-
ticated academic theories and practical policy prescriptions which, over
time, came to be accepted by many "right thinking people"---some of whom
used to think otherwise; it was sold to-and bought by---electorates which
had given up on the activist state; and it was implemented by more-or-less
democratic governments. In other words, the Washington Consensus is
something we did to ourselves. Second, we did it to ourselves rather differ-
ently in different countries. Germany is different from Brazil is different
from Korea; Canada because of its geopolitical situation is different from all
of the above, and uniquely susceptible to American influences; and within
Canada, Ontario's experience has not been quite the same as that of Alberta
or Qu6bec. Third, the Washington Consensus is a work-in-progress. Some
of its principal custodians, including the leadership of the World Bank, have
come to feel that if global capitalism does not soon acquire a human face, if
it does not soon deliver a decent life to the people whose destinies it shapes,
it will be repudiated or at very least destabilized.2 Consequently, in recent
years, we have seen some attempts to renovate the Washington Consensus,
to allow space for socially- and environmentally-sensitive policies, and to
ensure that free markets complement, rather than detract from, democratic
politics and the rule of law. Perhaps these attempts are genuine and will lead
to a new synthesis; perhaps they will produce a kinder and gentler Consen-
2 A recent study by the Centre for Economic and Policy Research, The Emperor Has No
Growth, suggests that compared to the previous twenty years, neo-liberal globalization
during 1980-2000 has been associated with slow growth and declining prosperity, not only
for the poorest but also for the middling and rich countries. For the first two groups of
countries, progress in improving life expectancy, infant survival and school enrolments
has also slowed. While not claiming to have conclusively demonstrated that neo-liberal
globalization caused slow growth, the study maintains that the burden of proof has shifted
to those who advocate neo-liberal policies. J. Steele, "G8 nations owe the world an apol-
ogy for globalization" Guardian Weekly (August 23-29, 2001) 23.
VoL 20
Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice
sus; perhaps they are only attempts to disguise the true nature of global neo-
liberalism, without changing its essentials. Time will tell.
Now to return to my main argument: the Canadian state is being trans-
formed by the Washington Consensus, by globalization and neo-liberalism,
with consequences, ultimately, for law and legal education. How, exactly,
is this transformation proceeding?
III. DISABLING, DELEGITIMATING AND DISPLACING THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE ACTIVIST STATE 3
For 200 years we have increasingly embraced the idea that the state's
primary obligation is to enhance the well-being and fulfill the aspirations
of its citizens. Consequently, we have got used to thinking of law as an
instrument for the advancement of emancipatory and ameliorative state
policies. If we want to correct the imbalance of power in the workplace,
reduce road accidents, protect consumers, enhance opportunities for mem-
bers of visible minorities or suppress the sale of tobacco, we pass laws.
And we expect those laws to produce results. If they do not, we expect
them to be revised, enforced more vigorously or replaced by new and better
laws. True, there is a large and growing literature which shows that laws
are not always effective, that they sometimes produce perverse outcomes
or to turn out to be fundamentally misconceived.4' Nonetheless, we had
come to accept this progressive and instrumental model of law as paradig-
matic, as grounding and giving legitimacy to the laws which we enact,
practise and teach.
However, this is not a model of law that sits comfortably alongside the
world-view of neo-liberalism, nor is it one that can easily be made opera-
tional in the kind of state which neo-liberalism seeks to construct. Conse-
quently, high on the agenda of neo-liberalism is a series of constitutional
initiatives designed to limit the use of law as a strategy of social reform. I
will mention three: the effort by neo-liberal governments in provinces such
as Alberta and Ontario to transfer power from the central government-
which alone can address issues of globalization and regulate national mar-
kets-to the provinces, which lack the capacity and the desire to do either
of those things; the neo-liberal attempt to shift power from the legislature,
the executive and the courts-the potential agents of state activism-to
"the people" whose exploitable fear of change can be mobilized through
referenda, polls and recall elections; and the introduction of formidable
legal constraints on the state's capacity to tax and its discretion to spend to
achieve social equity.
5
3 H. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich, "Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the
New Economy" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L. J. 1
4 This phenomenon was addressed in the very first volume of this journal. See D. Nelken,
"The 'Gap Problem' in the Sociology of Law" (1981) I Windsor YB. Access to Just. 35.
5 H. Arthurs, "Constitutionalizing Neo-conservaiism and Regional Economic Integration:
T1NA x 2" in T.J. Courchene (ed.) Room to Manoeuvre? Globalization and Policy Conver-
gence (Kingston: McGill-Oueen's University Press, 1999) at 17.
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Of course, it is not enough to simply constitutionalize limits on the state
and its legal system. On the one hand, it is necessary to convince people
that they are better off with a passive legal system than an active one. Con-
sequently, neo-liberals have become quite adept in undermining our belief
in the importance of law. For example, the substantive provisions of
Ontario's water quality, workplace safety, labour standards and environ-
mental protection laws have remained pretty much unchanged; but inspec-
tion and enforcement have been reduced, eliminated or privatized to the
point where these laws have become largely ineffective.6 As we come to
understand that there is not much point in seeking remedies from under-
staffed or dysfunctional government agencies, we begin to lose faith in the
model of legal activism itself. Or to take another example, possibly a con-
tentious one, laws used to have rather anodyne titles like the Income Tax
Act or the Elections Act: you knew what they were about-more or less-
and you accepted that they were part of the permanent fabric of state gover-
nance. However, Ontario's neo-liberals have adopted a new, didactic
approach to legislation. The charmingly entitled "Fewer Politicians Act"
effectively attenuates the relationship between citizens and their elected
representatives.7 The "Taxpayers' Protection Act" makes new taxes virtu-
ally impossible without a province-wide referendum. 8 And the "Balanced
Budgets for Brighter Futures Act" launched Ontario's withdrawal from
existing federal-provincial tax arrangements. 9 The neo-liberal state uses
law, then, to teach us to expect little from government, to despise politi-
cians, to resist taxation and to view the Canadian state as an obstacle to
progress.
On the other hand, it is not enough to destroy the reality and the image of
an active state legal system. Someone has to do the necessary jobs that state
law once did. Fortunately for neo-liberals, a private market in the produc-
tion and distribution of law has developed to fill the gap. Take legislation:
regulatory standards-once enshrined in statutes-are now found in corpo-
rate codes or in unilateral promises of good behaviour by the trucking
industry or the financial services industry. Take public administration:
policing, inspection and enforcement--once quintessential state func-
tions-are now provided by security guards, standards agencies, private
laboratories, industry ombudsmen and the "big five" auditing firms. And
even adjudication-for most lawyers the highest and most indispensable
6 I write these lines during the closing stages of Royal Commission inquiry into the tragedy
at Walkerton, a small Ontario town, where degradation of the local water supply led to the
death of seven inhabitants, and the illness of several thousand more. An important ques-
tion which the Commission will have to answer is the extent to which the provincial gov-
ernment's neo-liberal policies - privatization of provincial water testing laboratories,
reduced provincial inspection of local water systems - were responsible for the tragedy.
7 Statutes of Ontario 1996, c. 28. Companion statutes forced the amalgamation of a number
of Toronto-area municipalities, consolidated local school boards into large regional
boards, deprived them of the right to levy taxes, reduced their power to manage schools
and reduced payment of board members to a pittance. See City of Toronto Act, S.O.,1997,
c. 2, Education Quality Improvement Act, S.O., 1997, c. 31 and Fewer School Boards Act,
S.O., 1997, c. 3.
8 Taxpayer Protection Act, S.O. 1999 c. 7.
9 Bill 152, An Act to establish a made-in-Ontario tax system ( 3rd reading, Dec. 20, 2000).
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function of the state legal system-is now the business of a burgeoning
industry of private providers of mediation and arbitration services. It is no
accident that "government"-the exercise of state functions-is being
replaced in political, legal and popular discourse by the more generic "gov-
ernance."
10
To sum up, under neo-liberalism, the state legal system-understood as
the instrument of social justice and the source of individual and collective
rights-is in the process of being disabled, delegitimated and displaced.
IV. THE RE-INVENTION OF THE STATE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
To say this, however, is not to say that the state legal system is in danger
of being abolished any time soon. Indeed, in many ways, its continued
existence is necessary for the success of globalization and for neo-liberal-
ism, which is its dominant ideology. State law, in fact, is being deployed to
facilitate globalization and neo-liberalism.
As part of the price of admission to the global economy, states must
commit themselves to changing their domestic law to remove so-called
"non-tariff barriers" to free trade. Treaties which we willingly signed-
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFFA"), the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") and specific conventions on intellectual
property or technical standards-required extensive amendments to our
laws. Moreover, we have committed ourselves not to enact any new laws
which might encumber trade. Most notoriously, Chapter 11 of NAFFA
treats state regulation as a form of expropriation or "taking," and entitles
adversely affected companies to claim compensation against foreign gov-
ernments (though not against their own)."1 Several U.S. companies have
made successful Chapter 11 claims against Canada and, more importantly,
Chapter 11 has apparently deterred Canadian governments from embark-
ing on important regulatory projects for fear of severe financial repercus-
sions. 12 In short, a central principle of the unwritten neo-liberal
constitution of the global economy seems to be that national governments
should give priority to the promotion of trade and investment over virtu-
ally all other considerations. True, this principle is hotly contested in the
international sphere,' 3 but it seems to be gaining traction in Canada's
domestic law.
Furthermore, governments must not only abstain from measures which
impede trade. They must take positive steps to make it easier to do business
across national boundaries. Harmonization of law is one such step which,
10 B. Jessop, "Capitalism and its future: remarks on regulation, government and governance"
(1997) Rev. Int'l Pol. Economy 561 esp. 561 at 574 ff.
11 D. Schneiderman, "NAFTAs Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Can-
ada" (1996) 46 UTLJ 499.
12 At least one author believes that Ontario's NDP government was deterred from establish-
ing a public auto insurance monopoly because of Chapter 11. See P. Monahan, Storming
the Pink Palace: The NDP in Power (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1995).
13 R. Falk, Predatory Globalization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
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in Canada's case, means aligning its law with that of its dominant trading
partner, the United States. Obviously, not every line of our statute books is
being rewritten: there is no need for that. But in intellectual property law,
corporate and securities law, tax law and other key areas, Canada has been
systematically revising its legal system in order to make foreign-espe-
cially American-investors feel at home. And, I might mention, the courts
have begun to do likewise. As the Supreme Court of Canada suggested in a
recent judgment:
Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and peoples across state lines has
now become imperative. Under these circumstances, our approach to the rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would appear ripe for reap-
praisal.
14
Note: we are not simply changing our law because we are obliged to
under international treaties and conventions. We are "accommodating"-to
use the Supreme Court's word-a whole new transnational legal order
which has grown up in and around the global economy. This legal order-
sometimes referred to as the lex mercatoria--was crafted largely by global
law firms and consulting firms, by transnational industry associations, by
international arbitrators and by major companies which themselves promul-
gate the terms of their relational contracts with vast networks of customers,
suppliers, distributors, agents and subsidiaries.15 Consequently, it primarily
reflects the interests of the principal players in the global economy, not the
interests of local communities, consumers, businesses or workers. Nonethe-
less, states like Canada are generally willing to acquiesce passively in the
new" global legal order, to explicitly amend their national laws to "accom-
modate" it and, occasionally, to actively enforce it despite the fact that the
global regime may contravene or undermine national law or policy.'6 To put
into perspective this powerful impulse to bring Canadian law into confor-
mity with the law of the global economy, compare and contrast the extent to
which our globally-conscious judges and neo-liberal governments have
been galvanized into action by the conventions of the International Labour
Organization ("ILO"), the UN Covenants on Social and Economic Rights or
the Kyoto Protocol on reducing air-borne pollutants.
Legal changes to facilitate business transactions-global and domes-
tic-extend beyond private and commercial law to crucial areas of public
law.17 In the area of administrative law, for example, the buzz-words are
14 Morguard Investments v. De Savoye, [ 1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 1095-6. I am indebted to Rob-
er Wai for this reference.
15 See generally R. Appelbaum, W. Felstiner, V. Gessner (eds.) Rules and Networks: The
Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001).
16 For example, several decisions by the US Supreme Court allowed enforcement of interna-
tional arbitration rulings even though these may have had the effect of subverting US anti-
trust law. See e.g. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US 1 (1972), Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler, 473 US 1 (1985).
17 H. Arthurs, "'Mechanical Arts and Merchandise': Canadian Public Administration in the
New Economy" (1997) 42 McGillL. J. 29.
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"regulatory reform," "clearing away red tape" and "governing smarter"-
all items on the agenda of the World Bank, all features of the movement
towards "good global governance." A fair translation is that the main aim
of public law reform should be for governments to create a positive legal
environment for business, especially international business. However, this
presents all elected governments with a difficult problem: how to overtly
focus public law reform on facilitating market transactions without being
seen to abandon the other important values they espouse, the laws they
enact, the institutions they administer and the many needs and interests of
citizens and voters?
Because the mere invocation of their faith in markets by definition will
not resolve this problem, neo-liberal governments must turn to other strate-
gies. One such is to portray themselves as a neutral referee between com-
peting interests, as the custodian of a balance between legitimate but
opposing forces. In order to validate their "neutral" credentials, these gov-
ernments typically undertake two rhetorical strategies. First, they depict
women's groups, environmentalists, labour unions, municipal politicians
and even their own technical experts as "special interests" seeking illicit
preeminence over a responsible business community and "ordinary citi-
zens." Hence the Harris government's abolition of thirty or so government
agencies and policy units-notably the Employment Equity Commission,
the Women's Directorate and the Anti-Racism Directorate-which it
deemed to have excessive influence.1 8 And second, they seek to equate
human and social interests with business interests. Hence B.C.'s newly-
elected Labour Minister explaining his postponement "for further study"
of a ban on workplace smoking enacted by the previous NDP government:
I think the health and welfare of employees is extremely important, but I also
think that the health and welfare of small business people is extremely
important.' 9
Needless to say the Minister was not being even-handed as between two
groups of ordinary citizens-workers and business people-whose lungs
are, after all, equally susceptible to second-hand smoke. Rather, he was
"balancing" the economic health and welfare of businesses, large and
small, against the physical health and welfare of employees.
These strategies, and others, are designed to discredit the old social dem-
ocratic and progressive ideals of public law as an active force for good, to
free public law from the embrace of "special interests" which cling to the
old ideal, and to promote a new ideal which will inscribe neo-liberal values
in the deep structures of Canadian public law and public administration.
18 The government also abolished the Law Reform Commission which, presumably, had a
different law reform agenda than the one which is most favoured by neo-liberals. State-
ment of the Hon. David Johnson, Chair of the Management Board, Ontario Legislative
Assembly Debates (Hansard) 36 h Parliament, V' session at 3145-47 (29 May 1996).
19 K. Lunman, "B.C. delays workplace ban on smoking" Globe and Mail (25 August 2001)
A8.
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V. GLOBALIZATION OF THE MIND: CHANGING THE WAY WE
THINK ABOUT LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
What I have described so far represents a significant-some would say
revolutionary-shift in Canada's political economy and in its expression in
law and legal institutions. I want now to examine some possible explana-
tions of how this has come about and why it has been accomplished with
relative ease.
A number of explanations are plausible. One might argue that political
pendulums swing, that the arc of post-war social democracy and legal activ-
ism simply reached its extreme limit in the 1960s and 1970s, and that in a
natural and healthy way, things have been tending in the opposite direction
ever since. On this theory, at some point-perhaps soon-the pendulum
will begin to swing the other way. Alternatively, one might say that social
democracy and legal activism did not just exhaust themselves; they failed to
deliver on their promises and, in fact, created more problems than they
resolved-public enterprise, social housing, town planning, regional equal-
ization, the welfare system and the public school system being cases in
point. Or in another version of the same story, well-intentioned social jus-
tice agencies-Human Rights Commissions, for example-confused their
priorities, mis-spent their resources and ultimately collapsed under their
own weight. Or in yet one more version, as several studies have suggested,
rights-based litigation strategies to advance equality and social justice have
sometimes produced famous legal "victories" but seldom translated those
victories into a fundamental changes in society or the economy.
20
In the end, what matters most is not whether these diagnoses of the fail-
ure of the progressive or social democratic project were true or false, or
even whether they were the product of disinformation, misinformation or
sheer ideological perversity; what matters most is that a significant number
of important constituencies came to believe that activist strategies which
used law to achieve social change ultimately cost too much and achieved
too little. These constituencies included not only influential elites, of whom
more in a moment, but also much of the rank and file of the labour move-
ment in provinces such as Ontario and British Columbia and even members
of progressive social movements, who remained persuaded of the rightness
of their own particular cause, but not of the good faith, good sense or good
strategy of their sometime allies in government and civil society.
At very least, then, with some local variations in degree and timing, Can-
ada has experienced a disjuncture in progressive political and legal
thought, policies and strategies. And globalization has arrived at precisely
the right moment to allow neo-liberalism to fill the void. In effect, global-
ization captured the hearts and minds of our cosmopolitan, knowledge-
based elites-the influential politicians, business executives, community
leaders, civil servants, consultants, lawyers, journalists and academics
20 W. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and Political Life
of Canada (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1994); G. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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whose shared values and assumptions are so influential in shaping how we
think about public policy and how we translate it into law. There are a num-
ber of strands in this process, which I call "globalization of the mind.
2 1
The first strand is historical: Canada has always been a net importer of
legal institutions and ideas, at both ends of the political spectrum. The
sources of many of our current neo-liberal ideas are the United Kingdom
and especially the United States, but it is worth underlining our debt to
these countries, as well as the countries of Western Europe and Australasia,
for such imported progressive notions as public education, public health
care, publicly-owned railways and power systems, collective bargaining,
anti-discrimination legislation and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, not
to mention transformative approaches to law such as legal realism, feminist
legal theory, critical theory, deconstructionism and legal pluralism. 22 Our
elites, therefore, have always been open to foreign influences.
The second strand is more circumstantial and contemporary: Canada has
increasingly become a net importer of capital, technology and business cul-
ture-especially from the United States. In fact, in many sectors, our
branch-plant economy is effectively run from corporate head offices in
New York, Chicago and Detroit. Until fairly recently, a degree of manage-
rial autonomy was accorded Canadian subsidiaries-such as Chrysler Can-
ada or GE Canada-which allowed them to pursue fairly distinctive local
practices in their relations with local consumers, workers and suppliers.
But the integration of global financial markets, global production chains
and global management structures has shifted a great deal of decision-mak-
ing authority from the Canadian subsidiaries back to their corporate head
offices in the U.S. And in addition to tighter control by U.S. transnationals
of their Canadian subsidiaries, many Canadian companies have either
moved to the U.S. or been bought out by larger U.S. firms. This "hollowing
out" of corporate Canada has led to closer integration of the two economies
and to pressures to create an integrated North American business culture
and public policy environment. As I will shortly recount, this in turn has
led to the restructuring of the market for all of the services provided by our
elites, including law. 23 Thus, economic as well as intellectual forces make
Canada particularly susceptible to "globalization of the mind."
Third, as I mentioned earlier, the Washington Consensus is in the pro-
cess of renovating its image, and perhaps its reality as well, by stressing
that constitutionalism, the "rule of law" and "good governance" are neces-
sary, if not sufficient, conditions for the success of capitalism. 24 Neo-liber-
21 H. Arthurs, "Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal
Fields" (1998) 12 Can. J. L. & Soc. 219.
22 I have provided some examples in H. Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal Education: So Near
to Wall Street, So Far from God" (2001) Osgoode Hall L.J. 381 at 389 ff.
23 H. Arthurs, "The Hollowing out of Corporate Canada?" in J. Jenson and B. Santos (eds.)
Globalizing Institutions: Case Studies in Social Regulation and Innovation (London: Ash-
gate Press, 2000) at 29.
24 See e.g. J. Wolfensohn, The Other Crisis (Address to the World Bank Group, Oct. 6, 1998)
and A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (Discussion Draft, Jan. 21,
1999) both at www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf-text.htm.; G. Soros, The Crisis of Global Capi-
talism (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).
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als offer a coherent, if not compelling, explanation of the linkage between
global capitalism and democracy. Dynamic economies fuelled by global-
ization-they argue-will generate better jobs and living standards and a
more highly-educated and assertive citizenry; IMF conditional loans will
force recipient governments to end corruption, mismanagement and profli-
gate spending; technical assistance programs in education, public adminis-
tration and business, provided under the aegis of the World Bank, will
break the stranglehold on power of powerful local business elites and
repressive local cultures; the Internet and CNN will expose corrupt and
tyrannical governments to censure by democratic states and to financial
sanctions by high-minded corporate investors. The current version of glo-
balization, they contend, will ultimately provide the material resources,
political will and legal modalities to ensure-for ourselves and for less
privileged nations-respect for human rights, accountable democracies,
viable social services and a strong civil society.
All to the good, if true. But note: this same "rule of law discourse" has
historically been used to undermine interventionist governments and to
advance the fundamental neo-liberal premise of the Washington Consen-
sus, to ensure that states are weak and passive, that they lack the capacity
or desire to interfere with markets.2 5 So should we believe or doubt?
Should we take this new discourse at face value, or treat it sceptically, in
light of its neo-liberal provenance and pedigree? Many members of Can-
ada's elites have chosen to believe rather than to doubt, thereby declaring
their moral or ideological affinity, as well as their economic and intellec-
tual indebtedness, to their counterparts in other countries and to the domi-
nant ideas of globalization.
VI. CHANGES IN LEGAL PRACTICE IN CANADA'S NEW
POLITICAL ECONOMY
As might be expected, all of these changes in law and legal institutions,
driven by globalization and neo-liberalism and by changes in Canada's
political economy, have produced important changes in legal practice. I
will mention some examples-again acknowledging local diversity-
largely to enable me then to argue that the same changes ultimately explain
what is happening to legal education and scholarship.
The most obvious and dramatic change has been the consolidation and
internationalization of large Canadian law firms.26 Essentially, a small
number of law firms has always represented important domestic and for-
eign businesses. Most of these firms were concentrated in the same three or
four metropolitan centres which housed corporate head offices-Montreal,
Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, with a few more in government centres
25 B. Santos, "Law and Democracy: (Mis)trusting the Global Reform of Courts" in J. Jenson
and B. Santos, supra, note 23; W. Scheuerman, "Globalization and the Fate of Law" in D.
Dyzenhaus (ed.) Recrafting the Rule of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999).
26 H. Arthurs, "Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century" (1996) 15 Wind. YB. Access Just.
202, and "Poor Canadian Legal Education ....." supra note 22.
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such as Halifax, Quebec, Ottawa, Winnipeg and Edmonton. Over the past
ten or twenty years, however, there has been a pronounced tendency for
these firms to affiliate and then to amalgamate on a national basis so that
they could provide relatively seamless service to corporate clients across
the country, achieve a size sufficient to sustain a full range of practise spe-
cialties and promote themselves abroad to foreign corporations investing or
doing business in Canada. But this strategy had its limits. In fact, as global-
ization has proceeded apace, as corporate Canada has been "hollowed out,"
as more Canadian firms have moved abroad or been sold to foreign owners,
and as corporate head offices have repatriated corporate functions from
their Canadian subsidiaries, there are fewer and fewer large corporate cli-
ents to go around. For example, the globalization of financial markets has
greatly diminished the importance of Canadian stock exchanges and finan-
cial institutions and, therefore, the prospects of the elite law firms whose
members held corporate directorships in listed companies and provided
legal services associated with public share offerings.
And it is not only globalization that has created a problem for these elite
law firms. In certain respects, neo-liberalism has as well. De-regulation has
diminished the need for them to maintain large environmental law or
labour law departments; the privatization of adjudication has undercut the
earnings potential of litigation departments; reduction in tax rates--espe-
cially corporate tax rates-has diminished incentives for clients to pay for
elaborate tax planning strategies.
True, during any transitional period there will be more work for some
lawyers and law firms-more mergers and acquisitions work when foreign
firms are buying up Canadian companies, more contract work when public
enterprises and agencies are being privatized, more trade law as the WTO
and NAFTA offer new opportunities to challenge initiatives by Canadian
governments and, perhaps, more Charter litigation as the new culture of
constitutionalism absorbs disputes which used to be dealt with in the
domain of politics. But, on balance, this transitional period has exposed
Canadian law firms to significant new pressures. The advent of the global
economy has devalued their comparative advantage-knowledge of Cana-
dian law, politics and financial markets. It has exposed them to competition
from foreign law firms conveniently located in New York, London and
other global cities where-not by coincidence-the head offices of most
global corporations are also located. And perhaps most importantly, it has
introduced important new players into the corporate legal services mar-
ket-the multi-disciplinary consulting firms which already hold a signifi-
cant segment of that market in Europe and have begun to establish
themselves in Canada.
Faced with increased competition in a shrinking Canadian market, yet
driven by internal imperatives to continue to grow, Canadian law firms
have tried to establish themselves abroad. Alas, the success of this strategy
depends upon their being able to ride the coat-tails of their Canadian corpo-
rate clients-fewer and fewer of whom are significant players in the global
economy. The most attractive option for elite Canadian law firms is there-
fore to reinvent themselves so that they are either not elite, not law firms or
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not Canadian. And they are doing all three: some former labour and litiga-
tion departments of large law firms have been reincarnated as much smaller
free-standing niche practices; some firms have established what are, in
effect, multi-disciplinary practices; and some have formed partnerships or
alliances with U.S. firms in the hope of being able to reinvent themselves
as Washington or Wall Street firms.
27
Moreover, the effects of changes in our political economy are by no
means confined to elite firms. Globalization is also looming over general
practice-the heartland of the legal profession. The law firm equivalents of
H and R Block, the tax preparers, have emerged in the United States offer-
ing standard legal services-incorporation of companies, real estate trans-
actions, wills, divorces and routine collection cases-to middle class
clients at cut-rate prices. Because they operate through local franchises,
make extensive use of computer technology, trained paraprofessionals and
saturation advertising and have storefront offices in convenient locations,
they are able to generate high volumes-literally hundreds of thousands of
files per year-at low unit costs, which, in turn, allows them to charge low
fees. It would be relatively easy for these firms to use their know-how,
excess computer capacity and well-advertised reputations to move into the
Canadian market and to make life very uncomfortable indeed for lawyers
in small firms on this side of the border, just as they have done in the U.S.
The restructuring of the Canadian economy by globalization and neo-
liberalism has affected the prospects of general practitioners in other ways
as well. People in towns whose major employer shuts down, workers
whose wages have remained static for a decade, former employees of
much-reduced Canadian head offices are less able to afford summer cot-
tages, less likely to leave significant estates, less concerned about the prop-
erty dimensions of their marital disputes and less inclined to seek legal
redress against their employer: their need for legal services diminishes
accordingly. But every cloud has a silver lining. The new economy has
translated many former workers into self-employed contractors or consult-
ants; they may need legal advice in starting up their "businesses;" the
boom-and-bust cycle of e-commerce has created a neat little market for IP
and bankruptcy lawyers; and various rights which used to be enforced free
of charge by government departments now must be enforced by lawyers
acting for aggrieved citizens.
Finally, neo-liberalism has not just restructured the economy; it hag
restructured the legal apparatus of the state. Neoliberal cutbacks in govern-
ment spending and in government activism have reduced the government's
need for lawyers; social movements and intervener groups no longer sup-
ported by governments can no longer afford legal counsel; changes in legal
aid eligibility have reduced the financial prospects of lawyers in fields such
as immigration and refugee law; and the end of rent control and tenant
security have cut the ground out from under the lawyers who sat on or
appeared before housing tribunals.
27 "Poor Canadian Legal Education ..... supra note 22.
Vol. 20
Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice
Thus, changes in political economy have destabilized the careers of
many Canadian lawyers: their clientele has disappeared; they encounter
new forms of competition; their specialty has ceased to be economically
viable or their government job has vanished; their localized reputations and
connections are of limited value in a continental or global context.
This destabilisation has implications for the very notion of legal profes-
sionalism, for the formal and informal governance structures of the legal
profession, for the regulatory strategies of Law Societies, for rising and
declining lawyer constituencies, for the organization and compensation
strategies of law firms, for the creation of and access to new forms of pro-
fessional knowledge. These challenges to the profession-rooted in
changes in Canada's political economy--exacerbate the difficulties of gov-
erning a profession which has long been experiencing the centrifugal
effects of specialization and stratification, of changing demographics and
geographic distribution and of something approaching an intellectual revo-
lution. 28 Law Societies cannot make and enforce ethical codes, offer educa-
tion programs or run insurance schemes which have salience for widely
differing groups of members who constitute, in effect, multiple sub-profes-
sions. Nor can these sub-professions govern themselves. Law firms used to
shape professional careers and instill professional values through mentor-
ship, the promise of upward mobility, a performance-based reward system
and, especially, through an informal, largely hierarchical firm culture. Now
they are too large, too far-flung, too diverse and too unstable to do any of
these things well. And many individual lawyers, especially those in solo
practice or small firms, are in such a precarious position that their very self-
image as "professionals" is at risk. The result is that the profession is
becoming in many ways ungovernable-except of course by the very mar-
ket forces which are making it so.
It is difficult, then, to say what it means to be a lawyer in Canada today.
And if we cannot say who or what lawyers are, what they do, how they
must act, and what they must know, it is very difficult to imagine how we
ought to educate them.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
Which brings me-at last!-to legal education. Oddly perhaps, in light
of my advertised title, I arrive here a bit reluctantly. This is because I am
not going to be able to draw a straight line which connects the dots which I
have scattered through my analysis. Legal education does not exhibit all
the consequential effects of globalization and neo-liberalism which I have
tried to describe. Not yet, at least. There are reasons for this, which I had
better outline before I go any further.
First, there are the effects of simple time lag. Universities and their law
faculties are institutions in which fundamental values and well-established
28 H. Arthurs, "A Lot of Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Will the Legal Profession Sur-
vive the Knowledge Explosion?" (1995) 18 Dalhousie LJ. 295.
2001
The State We're In
ways of seeing the world and dealing with it are slow to change, perhaps in
the present circumstances happily so. Second, universities and their law
faculties are, by their nature, incurably oppositional. Some of the most
severe and incisive critics of globalization and neo-liberalism have been
professors and students, including many in law schools. Third, as it hap-
pens, over the past twenty years or so, Canadian law schools have become
more like other university faculties in terms of the political perspectives,
intellectual credentials and career trajectories of their professors and the
academic sophistication of their students. Because this "academic normal-
ization" of law faculties has weakened the profession's influence over how
law schools define and pursue their goals, it has also to an extent delayed,
if not deflected, the effect on law schools of the current professional crisis.
And finally, for much the same reason-its increasingly close ties with the
rest of the university-law as an intellectual discipline has been going
through a renaissance over the past twenty or thirty years. This has ener-
gized many faculty members and created a sense of collective purpose in
the professoriate which has helped to sustain momentum through times of
trouble.
So much for disclaimers. How have changes in "the state we're in"-and
especially the provinces we're in-affected Canadian law schools?29
Some effects of the new political economy have come to bear directly on
law schools. Specifically, they have experienced the effect of government
cutbacks on funding for higher education. Because the formula which gov-
erns the distribution of government funds was devised before law came
into its own as a university discipline, law has been run on the cheap for a
very long time. This situation was exacerbated as universities generally
began to experience severe cut-backs, especially through most of the
1990s. The results were totally predictable: a virtual embargo on faculty
hiring, deteriorating faculty-student ratios, facilities, libraries and services
and inadequate student aid. And one other result was, with hindsight, also
totally predictable: the need for law schools to seek alternative sources of
funding.
These alternative sources were, inevitably, those mandated by the neo-
liberal policies of our provincial government: increased student fees and
increased support from the legal profession. 30 Both present obvious risks:
that the "usual suspects"-the poor, blacks and indigenous peoples-will
be deterred from pursuing law degrees; that students will be forced to
29 H. Arthurs, "The Political Economy of Canadian Legal Education" (1998) 25 J. Law &
Soc. 14; H. Arthurs, "The World Turned Upside Down: Are Changes in Political Econ-
omy and Legal Practice Transforming Legal Education and Scholarship? Or Vice Versa?"
(forthcoming, 2002).
30 In Ontario, these policies included: an overall per capita, inflation-adjusted reduction in
university grants; the deregulation of student fees in law and other professional degree
programs; the requirement that a designated portion of increased fee revenue should be
used for student financial aid; the "freezing" of fees for students receiving the highest
level of OSAP financial aid; and the provision of matching funds to encourage donations
to student financial aid programs established at each university. So far, other provinces-
notably Quebec and British Columbia-have not adopted similar policies on student fees
in law schools.
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neglect their studies to work part-time; that graduates burdened by debt
will be unable to practice in low-paying legal aid, community and cause-
advocacy settings; that law firms and other donors will exercise their pip-
ers' privileges to call the tune in law school curriculums, appointments and
research. These are all very real risks; they account for the extreme reluc-
tance with which most deans and faculties have adopted this new approach.
However, I believe that most law schools have so far succeeded in preserv-
ing accessibility, academic integrity and intellectual autonomy while at the
same time putting their new resources to good use. But I acknowledge that
some observers contend that the new, neo-liberal dispensation in our uni-
versities has already justified everyone's worst fears.31
Certainly, new dangers lie ahead. Governments mesmerized by the
magic of competitive markets are increasingly providing new funding
based on performance indicators, ostensibly to ensure that tax-payers and
fees-paying students get "value for money" from universities. The problem
is that neo-liberal or market-related performance indicators are not likely to
reflect the intellectual priorities or political propensities of many law pro-
fessors and students. Consequently, law schools which accept applicants
with unconventional credentials, teach students critical theory or produce
future anti-establishment practitioners are unlikely to be rated "highly" or
financed generously. But note the irony: by decreasing their dependence on
public funds in the first place, governments may have inadvertently buff-
ered law schools somewhat from the effects of government-decreed perfor-
mance standards.
In parallel to the new funding arrangements for law faculties, govern-
ments have been developing new strategies for legal research. On the one
hand, they have radically reduced their direct investment in policy studies
and law reform research. This has deprived legal scholars not only of
funds but of influence, no doubt as intended. On the other hand, they have
increased grants for academic research with the predictable proviso that
the additional funds be directed to fields which the government deems
important. Law has not been a beneficiary of this new, targeted support for
research. For doctrinal scholars who may not want or need funding, not
much harm has been done; but for the growing number of interdisciplinary
legal scholars, who do need funding, these policies are frustrating. More-
over, because some government research priorities involve law-e-com-
merce, efficiency, health, international trade, money laundering, produc-
tivity-there is a risk that some scholars will go where the money is rather
than where their intellectual curiosity or social conscience might take
31 See e.g. H. Glasbeek and R. Hasson, "Some Reflections on Legal Education" (1987) 50
Modern L. Rev. 777;J. Kelsey, "Privatizing the Universities" (1998) 25J. L. & Soc. 51; A.
Goldsmith, "Standing at the Crossroads: Law Schools, Universities, Markets and the
Future of Legal Scholarship" and J. Webb, "Post-Fordism and the Reformation of Liberal
Legal Education" in F. Cownie (ed.) The Law School - Global Issues, Local Questions
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing/Ashgatc Publishing, 1999); M. Thornton, "Law as
Business in the Corporate University: Business-Oriented Legal Knowledge vs Socio-
Legal Scholarship" (2000) Alternative Leg. J. 269.
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them. Once again, however, as a recent study seems to show, the legal
research community has not so far succumbed to temptation.
32
To this point, I have been talking about neo-liberal policies which are
directly aimed at higher education. Now I will return to the broader
changes in Canada's political economy which I traced out earlier in my
paper. In many ways, their effects on the legal academy are more insidious,
fundamental and potentially long-lasting.
In the first place, I would argue, we have come to understand the sub-
stantive content of law quite differently under globalization and neo-liber-
alism. If many legal functions are no longer performed by the state, if the
locus of law making has shifted from national to transnational forums and
from the public to the private sphere, how long can we continue to teach
almost exclusively the parochial law of the Canadian state?33 Do we not
have to make more room for teaching public and private international law,
for the intellectual property law and business law of the United States, for
the law of corporate codes and private prisons? Of course, this is a high risk
enterprise. Few Canadian law professors know much about these fields;
there is no guarantee that students will practice this sort of law, even if it
does ultimately control our lives; and indeed, there may not be anything
much to teach or study: many scholars question the very existence of a lex
mercatoria. But most importantly, such a shift in the curriculum wrenches
law out of its familiar context, out of "the state we're in," and allows it to
float free as a set of disembodied concepts detached from the politics and
economics and culture of any particular jurisdiction. That detachment from
context has always been a problem for comparativists; 34 it is a problem still
for those who claim to perceive the near-universal acceptance or adaptation
of American legal values and institutions; 35 it is a problem for me.36
Second, we have to reassess the social and political potential of law
itself. Most Canadian law professors spent their formative years absorbing
and then disseminating the notion that law could and should function as a
silver bullet which would right wrongs, change attitudes, empower citizens
32 T. Shanahan, "Legal Scholarship: An analysis of faculty research activity in Ontario's
common law schools" Paper presented to the Canadian Law and Society Association,
Qu6bec, May 2001.
33 See e.g. A. Blacket, "Globalization and its Ambiguities: Implications for Law School
Curricular Reform" (1998) 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 57; W. Twining, "A Cosmopolitan
Discipline of Law? Some Implications of 'Globalisation' for Legal Education" and H.
Arthurs, "The World Turned Upside Down: Are Changes in Political Economy and Legal
Practice Transforming Legal Education and Scholarship? Or Vice Versa?" The W. G.
Hart Workshop on Legal Education, Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, University of
London, June 2001 (forthcoming).
34 See e.g. 0. Kahn-Freund, Selected Writings/Otto-Freund (London: Stevens, 1978).
35 See J. deLislc, "Lex Americana? United States legal assistance, American legal models,
and legal change in the post-communist world and beyond" (1999) 20 U. Pennsylvania J.
Int'l Economic L. 179; J. Flood, "Legal Education, Globalization and the New Imperial-
ism" in F. Cownie (ed.) supra note 31; R. Keleman and E. Sibbett, "The Globalization of
American Law" Paper delivered at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting,
Budapest, July 2001. But see B. Ackerman, "The Rise of World Constitutionalism" (1997)
83 Virginia L. Rev. 771.
36 "The World .... supra note 33.
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and deter abuses of power. But in Canada's new political economy, we
have had to crank down our expectations of law, if not change them
entirely. On the one hand, law is no longer about making the world a better
place; it is about making the world safe for markets. On the other, judicial
activism-legal activism more generally-is under attack by populists and
neo-liberals; and even its foremost practitioners seem to be on the defen-
sive. How long, then, will future Canadian law students-who have grown
up with a different set of cultural assumptions about law-sit still while
their professors drone on about dramatic law reforms which will never
come, about social revolutions which will never occur?
Third, we have to contend with the effects of an emerging continental, if
not global, market for legal services and legal knowledge-a market which
American law schools are eager to exploit.37 If Canadian law graduates
want to practice business law on Wall Street or in Singapore or Frankfurt-
and some do-what point is there in their knowing the idiosyncrasies of
Canadian Charter law or trust law or criminal law? Indeed, why study law
in Canada at all? Similar questions arise for Canadian legal scholars. If
they want to be recruited to teach in American or English universities-and
some have-would they not be better to seek careers there initially, or at
least to make their reputations by publishing in non-Canadian journals on
non-Canadian subjects? 38 One can easily imagine that these new career
possibilities for professors and students may launch a new dynamic in
Canadian law schools.
39
Finally, I think we are witnessing a change in the behaviour of the pri-
mary institutional and individual actors in legal education-law schools,
their committees and councils, their deans and professors and students.
Here is where neo-liberalism and globalization may ultimately play them-
selves out.
Canadian law schools have long been competitive in a healthy sense.
They wanted to be the best they could be, and of course they wanted to per-
suade themselves and others that they had succeeded. But not much turned
on being-or being thought to be-the best. Now a great deal does. Suc-
cess begets more resources in the form of higher government grants and
larger donations and greater latitude to charge students higher fees; more
resources in turn beget the possibility of innovation in curriculum, teaching
and research, improve the odds of hiring and retaining interesting and able
faculty members; and all of these beget the prospect of more success and
more resources and so on ad infinitum. So law schools have to invest a
great deal in success and the appearance of success. This they do especially
by offering distinctive new pedagogies, courses or curricula, by establish-
37 See e.g. "Symposium on Globalization and Legal Education" (1996) 46J. Leg. Ed. 311 et
seq.; D. Clark, "Transnational Legal Practice: The Need for Global Law Schools" (1998)
46 American J. Comp. L. 261; M. Drumbl, "Amalgam in the Americas: A Law School
Curriculum for Free Markets and Open Borders" (1998) 35 San Diego L. Rev. 1053; but
see A. Blacket supra note 33.
38 Compare A. Scott, "Does Living in Canada Make One a Canadian Economist?" (1993) 26
Can. J. Economics 26.
39 Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal Education . supra note 22.
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ing special research centres or partnerships with foreign institutions or by
preparing people for specific practice roles in, say, global law firms or at
the local bar. And they try to enhance their own reputations with new build-
ings, with admissions brochures and fundraising propaganda, with celebra-
tory occasions such as special anniversaries and even with public lectures.
Ideally, these innovations and image-building exercises will have intrinsic
merit, will succeed in their own terms and will produce the desired result of
more resources and the blessings that flow therefrom. But we all know that
some may be bogus, driven by a desire to placate governments or attract
donors, rather than by academic values.
To understand which tendency is likely to prevail over the long term, we
have to consider the new dynamic of governance at work in Canadian law
faculties, a dynamic which clearly emanates from the new competitive
market-place for legal education. Now that students pay a significantly
higher part of the cost of their education, they are becoming empowered
"consumers" with enhanced power to "vote with their feet," to send market
signals to law school administrators and faculty councils about what profile
to maintain in the competition for students, what kind of curriculum and
support services to provide, what kind of faculty to hire in order to ensure
student satisfaction and alumni support. And by coincidence, as if in antic-
ipation of the new rule-of-law rhetoric of global capitalism, students (and
faculty members, for that matter) have also begun to see themselves as
individual bearers of rights, rather than as members of a scholarly commu-
nity or collegium. In all these ways, legal education is not only being
reshaped by neo-liberal forces pressing on it from the outside; it is being
re-programmed by a neo-liberal dynamic of governance which has been set
in motion from within.
VIII. CONCLUSION: REMINISCING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF
CANADIAN LEGAL EDUCATION
If the social and political functions of law change, if the substantive con-
tent of law changes, if the models of lawyering used to instruct and inspire
students change, if the lives of students and professors change, if the values
and processes of institutional decision-making change, so too will the dis-
course and deep structures of legal pedagogy and scholarship-the hypo-
theticals used in class, the problems and essays assigned in exams, the
ideological and intellectual content of informal common room discussions,
and the political tone and subject matter of academic books and articles.
That globalization and neo-liberalism are transforming Canadian legal
education comes as no surprise. After all, we are in, of, about and for the
state. But remember: we are also-in part-against the state and against
the dominant models of law and lawyering which the state endorses at any
given moment. Therein lies our strength and-possibly--our salvation.
Canadian law schools have confronted power before, have challenged the
state and its legal system before and its universities too; and they have
often prevailed. In the 1930s Frank Scott, a McGill law teacher, helped
found the League for Social Reconstruction and the CCF-precursors of
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the NDP; in the 1940s Bora Laskin, a professor at Osgoode, spoke out for
civil liberties and the rights of workers; in the 1950s Cecil Wright, Dean of
Law at Toronto challenged the Law Society's -control of legal education
and John Willis exposed the intellectual vacuity of judicial conceptualism
and conservatism. In the 1960s a few dozen young law professors across
the country made a revolution in legal research and pedagogy and ushered
in new strategies for providing access to legal services; in the 1970s and
1980s a larger and more diverse body of activist law students and faculty
members built on that revolution to establish a tradition of progressive
advocacy and engaged scholarship; and in the 1990s a new generation of
law professors, graduate students and independent scholars has moved us
forward again by dazzling displays of doctrinal, critical and interdiscipli-
nary scholarship, far exceeding previous generations-including their rev-
olutionary forbears.
So: the energy, the intelligence, the social commitment, ultimately the
optimism of Canadian law schools has often emerged during moments of
creative tension between the legal system of "the state we're in" and an
alternative vision of a more just state and legal system. We are in one of
those moments now, in this era of globalization and neo-liberalism. Law
schools may not be able to change the world, to transform the law or even
to save the soul of the profession. But perhaps, just possibly, they can
change themselves.
What a moment. What a challenge.
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